stitutionality of state regulations affecting interstate commerce 3 and has applied them without substantial concern for their impact on its precedents of an earlier era. To be sure, not all of the Court's contemporary Commerce Clause opinions fit easily into the suggested pattern, 5 and what appears as a clear pattern may be only a haphazard arrangement. Hughes v. OklahomaO emerges, however, as yet another piece in the developing mosaic of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
I. THE HUGHES DECISION

A. THE FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The essential facts in the case were simple and undisputed. Through its Wildlife Conservation Code, 7 Oklahoma had established a statutory scheme governing the acquisition, transportation, and sale of minnows in the State. The Code provided for the licensing of persons seeking to seine, transport, or sell minnows in the State for commercial purposes. 8 It imposed no restriction on the number of minnows a person so licensed was permitted to take from state waters. The Code stipulated, however, that "[n] o person may transport or ship minnows for sale outside the state which were seined or procured within the waters of this state." 9 The prohibition was inapplicable to persons "leaving the state possessing three (3) dozen or less minnows" or to the "sale and shipment of minnows raised in a regularly licensed commercial minnow hatchery."'" In substance, then, the statute forbade the transportation for out-of-state to distinguish its earlier decision in Geer v. Connecticut, 6 which sustained over Commerce Clause objections a Connecticut statute forbidding the transportation outside the State of game birds lawfully killed within the State. The ground of distinction was that Connecticut had prevented the game from becoming an article of interstate commerce by requiring it to be retained for consumption or use in the State, whereas Louisiana allowed "its shrimp to be taken and all the products thereof to be shipped and sold in interstate commerce," thereby "releas [ing] its hold" on the shrimp and putting "an end to the trust upon which the State is deemed to own or control the shrimp for the benefit of its people. "' 17 In Hughes, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found Geer and its progeny rather than Foster-Fountain controlling. It reasoned: ' 8 The United States Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that the wild animals and fish within a state's borders are, so far as capable of ownership, owned by the state in its sovereign capacity for the common benefit of all its people.
Because of such ownership, and in the exercise of its police power, the state may regulate and control the taking, subsequent use and property rights that may be acquired therein....
Oklahoma law does not prohibit commercial minnow hatcheries within her borders from selling stock minnows to anyone, resident or nonresident, and minnows purchased therefrom may be freely exported. However, the law served to protect against the depletion of minnows in Oklahoma's natural streams through commercial exportation. No person is allowed to export natural minnows for sale outside of Oklahoma. Such a prohibition is not repugnant to the commerce clause.
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the Oklahoma law violated the Commerce Clause.'-Repudiating its decision in Geer v. Connecticut, the Court determined that Oklahoma's statutory scheme must be evaluated under the same criteria governing the validity of state regulation of other natural resources, and that, under these criteria, Oklahoma's law could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Oklahoma never suggested and the Court never considered that Congress had, in fact, consented to the statute by making it unlawful for any person knowingly "to transport. . , in interstate or foreign commerce, any black bass and other fish, if such ... transportation is contrary to the law of the State... from which such black bass or other fish is transported." 20 Indeed, a similar provision may be read as granting congressional consent to the result in Geer as well. 21 Thus, Hughes may well have been wrongly decided in light of Congress' broad power to consent to state laws that would, in the absence of such consent, impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 2 In any event, Hughes retains its significance for purposes of the present inquiry as the most recent expression of the Court's views regarding the negative implications of the Commerce Clause.
The overruling of Geer v. Connecticut. The state court's
reliance on Geer as a basis for sustaining Oklahoma's ban on the transportation of natural minnows for out-of-state sale was fully understandable. Geer had, after all, upheld over Commerce Clause objections a prohibition against the transportation beyond the State of game birds lawfully killed within it. Once the Supreme Court agreed to hear Hughes's appeal, however, it was apparent that a defense predicated on Geer would face rough going.
The Court's analysis in Geer was rooted in its understanding of "the earliest traditions [ofl] the right to reduce animals ferae naturae to possession, '3 which it gleaned from a reading of Athenian, 24 Roman, 2 Salic, 26 feudal, 27 and English common law. 28 The Court had reasoned that wild game within a State, until reduced to possession, belonged to the people, who "owned" the game collectively for the common benefit of all; 29 that the State, as representative of its citizens, was invested with the authority to exercise the power that was derived from this "common ownership" "as a trust for the benefit of the people"; 30 that this power could be exercised not only fo control the taking of game within the State but also to determine the nature of the property rights acquired in any game so taken; 3 that the power therefore could be employed "to keep the property, if the sovereign so chooses, always within its jurisdiction for every purpose"; 32 and, that:
33
The power of the State to control the killing of and ownership in game being admitted, the commerce in game, which the state law permitted, was necessarily only internal commerce, since the restriction that it should not become the subject of external commerce went along with the grant and was part of it.
The Court in Geer proffered a second ground for its determination that Connecticut's embargo on the exportation of game did not offend the Commerce Clause. The statute represented an appropriate exercise of the State's police power derived from "the duty of the State to preserve for its people a valuable food supply."
The Court declared that the existence of this power was "equally conclusive" 35 of the outcome of the case as was the existence of state authority "derived from the common ownership of game and the trust for the benefit of its people which the State exercises in relation thereto." 3 6 From this one might conclude that the "police power" rationale was independent of the "common ownership" rationale. Yet in the next breath the Court inextricably linked the two theories in observing that the State's police power to protect its people against adulteration of food carried with it "the existence of a like power to preserve a food supply which belongs in common to all the people of the State which can only become the subject of ownership in a qualified way, and which can never be the object of commerce except with the consent of the State and subject to the conditions which it may deem best to impose for the public good." 37 Whether Geer was predicated on one or two theories, its rationale (in either configuration) had been discredited by subsequent Su-3 o Ibid. 4 Id. at 534. 31 1d. at 530. 33 Id. at 532.
3 Id. at 535.
HeinOnline --1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 56 1979 preme Court cases. The proposition that the State "owned" wild game within its borders for the common benefit of its citizens had been undermined by a series of decisions explicitly or implicitly rejecting such a contention. The Court had sustained the exercise of the federal treaty-making power over migratory birds in the face of a State's claim that this interfered with the State's ownership and control of wild animals within its boundaries, and it had remarked in passing that " [t] o put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed."" 8 It had invalidated a prohibition on the exportation of shrimp taken within state waters until their heads and shells had been removed, dismissing arguments advanced by the State on the basis of its alleged ownership of the shrimp. 39 It had struck down a state tax and regulatory scheme that discriminated against out-of-state commercial shrimp fishermen, disparaging the "ownership theory" as a legal fiction that stood as a proxy for other values the State might legitimately pursue, but not by discriminatory means. 4 " And, most recently, the Court had repudiated Geer's reasoning by making short shrift of the argument that a State's purported ownership of fish swimming in its territorial waters empowered it to forbid nonresident federal licensees from fishing there:
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A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning" wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession by skillful capture. ... The "ownership" language of cases such as those cited by appellant must be understood as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction expressing "the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource."... Under modern analysis, the question is simply whether the State has exercised its police power in conformity with the federal laws and Constitution.
Indeed, under the weight of these precedents, the State in Hughes Nor had the proposition that the States possessed the power (and, indeed, the duty) to conserve for their own citizens a valuable local food supply weathered the ravages of subsequent case law. The Court had held that States lacked the power to prohibit or limit the exportation of natural gas in the face of claims advanced by the States that they possessed "[t] he right to conserve, or . . . reserve, the resources of the State for the use of the inhabitants of the State, present and future." 4 3 The Court reasoned in these cases that whatever police power the States might have to conserve natural resources located within their borders, this power could not be exercised to limit the shipment or sale of privately owned resources in interstate commerce merely because they were needed by in-state consumers. 44 Geer and its progeny were distinguished on the ground that they involved resources deemed to be owned by the State 45 -a proposition whose erosion was continuing apace with the dismantling of the broadly conceived conservation rationale. Moreover, as if events were conspiring to augur the impending demise of Geer, the Court had recently been provided with an opportunity to match its unkind remarks about Geer's ownership rationale with similarly critical comments about its conservation rationale. In holding that a State lacked power under the Commerce Clause to forbid the transportation of waste from other States into privately owned landfills within the State, the Court cited favorably its "decisions holding that a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders. '46 In Hughes, the Court was faced with the first case "in modem times to present facts essentially on all fours with Geer. ' 2. The Court's opinion on the merits. Once it had discarded the "common ownership" and local conservation rationales underlying Geer, the Court was compelled to draw upon other principles of adjudication to resolve the controversy before it. Here the Court turned to a formulation of the criteria governing the constitutionality of state regulations affecting interstate commerce that has become familiar reading to students of the Court's recent Commerce Clause opinions:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Under these standards, the Court easily concluded that Oklahoma's statutory scheme failed to pass constitutional muster. Rather than regulating "evenhandedly," the law discriminated on its face against interstate commerce by blocking the flow of such commerce in natural minnows at the State's borders. 50 After suggesting that discrimination of this nature might give rise to "a virtually per se rule of invalidity," 5 ' the Court nevertheless proceeded to 4 13Ibid. evaluate the justification offered by the State for the discrimination but only under "the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives." 52 The "legitimate local purpose" advanced by Oklahoma in defense of the statute was its function as a "conservation measure.1 5 3
The Court acknowledged that the State's interest in preserving the ecological balance in its waters by restricting the removal of large numbers of minnows might well qualify as a legitimate local purpose. 54 Indeed, the Court was willing to characterize such interests as "similar to the States' interests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens,"" interests to which it has traditionally accorded considerable deference. 5 6 But the question under the rubric articulated by the Court was one of degree, and whether the burden imposed by the State on interstate commerce was constitutionally tolerable would turn not only on the local interest involved but also on the availability of less burdensome means for achieving the same ends. The Court was firm in its conviction that the Oklahoma law failed on this score. The State had "chosen to 'conserve' its minnows in the way that most overtly discriminates against interstate commerce ... even though nondiscriminatory alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the State's purported legitimate local purpose more effectively." 57 Thus Oklahoma had, with a commercially insignificant exception, flatly proscribed the exportation of natural minnows for out-of-state sale, even though it might have pursued its objectives as well by restricting the number of minnows licensed dealers could take from state waters or by limiting the way in which such minnows might be disposed of in the State. 58 to implement its legislative ends by contending that the statutory scheme embodied a closer fit between means and ends than might appear at first blush. Oklahoma argued that the ban on commercial exportation was the most effective means to maintain the desired ecological balance. The prohibition on transportation for out-ofstate sale, it was claimed, would assure that minnows seined and sold in Oklahoma would be "returned to Oklahoma waters in the form of bait," a procedure that served to "accommodate the recreational fisherman, while preserving the habitat and balance of aquatic wildlife provided by nature.","' The Court dismissed this suggestion in a footnote. 60 It observed that this theory, which the State was advancing for the first time on appeal, was predicated on factual assumptions that were unsupported by the record, and it characterized the argument as a "post-hoc rationalization."'" The State's "bare assertion" 62 was wholly inadequate to overcome the presumptive invalidity of a facially discriminatory statute. Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's decision in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice. Mr. Justice Rehnquist had no quarrel with the Court's abandonment of the "common ownership" doctrine of Geer. He would, however, have sustained the Oklahoma statute relying on the principles underlying Geer's "alternative basis"-"that a State, in the exercise of its police power, could act to preserve for its people a valuable food supply, even though interstate commerce was remotely and indirectly affected." 63 Apart from the technical dispute over the independent significance of the Geer Court's alternative rationale, 4 the crux of the disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions was the weight each 3 Brief for Appellee, p. 3. 62 Ibid. cl 99 S. Ct. at 1737 n.20.
64 Mr. Justice Rehnquist was of the view that the Geer Court's "police power" rationale was independent of its "common ownership" rationale. In light of his views regarding the scope of this police power, see 99 S. Cc. at 1739-40 and text infra, at note 65, he saw no reason to overrule Geer. The majority, on the other hand, relying on the Geer Court's failure to distinguish clearly between the premises underlying the two rationales, see text supra, at note 37, believed that the "police power" rationale was simply a corollary of the "common ownership" rationale. 99 S. Ct. at 1732 n.6. The majority also believed, however, that the "alternative basis" of Geer (as quoted supra, in the text above and at note 34), even if viewed independently, had failed to survive subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See 99 S. Ct. at 1732 n.6 and text supra, at notes 43-46. gave the State's interest in conservation and the view each held of what constitutes discrimination against interstate commerce. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, unlike the majority, would have permitted the State's "special interest" in preserving wildlife to prevail over Commerce Clause objections unless it represented "a naked attempt to discriminate against out-of-state enterprises in favor of in-state business unrelated to any purpose of conservation." ' Consistent with this view, he found no discrimination in the Oklahoma scheme because the proscription on exportation applied to residents and nonresidents alike, did not protect residents from out-of-state competition, and was not employed as a means of inducing nonresident minnow exporters to shift their business operations into the regulating State. For the majority, by contrast, the fact that the state regulation substantially obstructed the flow of interstate commerce was in itself sufficient to condemn the regulation-or at least render it highly suspect-regardless of whether the obstruction had a differential economic impact on in-state and out-of-state interests.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist carried his dispute with the majority one step further by asserting, in light of the fact that hatchery-bred minnows were freely available for exportation, that the record did not support a determination that interstate commerce in minnows had been blocked by the Oklahoma legislation. In substance, Mr. Justice Rehnquist was willing to sustain the statute failing proof by Hughes that the purchase of hatchery-bred rather than natural minnows would have been less desirable, more costly, or otherwise burdensome to his business operations. Mr. Justice Rehnquist would thus have stood the majority's analysis on its head: while the Court, having found discrimination on the face of a statute, would impose upon the State the burden of demonstrating the absence of less discriminatory means for accomplishing the same ends, he would impose upon a person subject to a discriminatory statute the burden of demonstrating the absence of equally efficient alternatives to avoid its impact.
Viewing the Court's decision in Hughes in isolation, one would be hard pressed to conclude that it represented a case of much significance. It is a commonplace of modern Commerce Clause analysis that the Court, in delineating the implied limitations that the Clause imposes on state legislation, is engaged in a delicate balancing of state and national interests."' The critical analytical problem, therefore, is to determine how the accommodation between competing demands of national economic unity and legitimate state policy is reached. The Court's recent Commerce Clause opinions-of which Hughes is the latest-suggest that the balancing process is being undertaken in a more consistent fashion than in the past.
It was in 1970 that the Court first articulated the formulation of Commerce Clause principles to which it has returned with remarkable regularity ever since. In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 6 T an Arizona official had issued an order prohibiting a company from transporting Arizona-grown cantaloupes to California because they had not been packed according to the requirements of an Arizona statute. The company had been conducting its packing operations in Cali- fornia, and it was stipulated that "the practical effect of the [state official's] order would be to compel the company to build packing facilities in ... Arizona. '! 68 Recognizing that the order "affected" and "burdened" interstate commerce, and that the critical question was whether it did so unconstitutionally, the Court unanimously declared: 69 Although the criteria for determining validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues, but more frequently it has spoken in terms of "direct" and "indirect" effects and burdens.
Under these standards, the Arizona statute at issue failed to survive constitutional scrutiny. The State's interest in "promot[ing] and preserv [ing] the reputation of Arizona growers by prohibiting deceptive packaging" ' 7 carried insufficient weight to offset the nation's interest in unfettered interstate commerce.
As Professor Kurland has observed, Pike was just "[a]n oldfashioned Commerce Clause case" whose outcome was predictable, and the fact that it even elicited an opinion from the Court may well have been "testimony to the advocate's skills of appellant's counsel and little more." 71 Indeed, a textual analysis of the Pike formulation raises many more questions than it answers. Thus the formulation does not tell us when a statute regulates "evenhandedly," see note 102 infra and accompanying text, nor what constitutes a "legitimate local public interest," nor what kinds of effects on interstate commerce are "incidental." It does not tell us whether a statute's failure to meet any one of these tests necessarily means that it is unconstitutional, or whether one must continue to balance state and national interests, but with altered presumptions. See text infra, at notes 103-06. And it does not tell us what respect is to be accorded to various local interests nor how to determine whether an alternative scheme might promote such interests "as well." See text infra, at notes 89-93 and 107-10. This is not meant to suggest, however, that the Pike formulation was designed to answer any of these questions. we may speak with more confidence about the narrow principle for which a particular case stands as well as the Court's view of the relative importance of various state interests. For example, it seems fair to conclude from Pike itself that a State's legitimate interest in preserving the reputation of a local industry is less substantial than the nation's interest in permitting business operations to be performed at their most efficient locations." 9 Moreover, we know that the State's interest asserted in Pike is less substantial in the Court's eyes than the State's interest in the safety, health, or employment of its citizens.9 0 We have also been told in recent opinions that the State's interest in safety ranks high in the Court's constellation of values, 9 ' that highway safety may enjoy an especially exalted status, 92 and that the State's interests in conservation and protection of wild animals are "similar" to its interest in health and safety."
Second, the Court's apparent conviction that the Pike formulation embodies the controlling criteria for adjudicating contemporary Commerce Clause controversies is evidenced by its willingness to repudiate doctrine and precedent inconsistent with the Pike standards. In Raymond Motor, the Court emphatically rejected Wisconsin's contention, based on earlier cases, 94 that "the general rule of Pike is not applicable to a State's regulation of motor vehicles in the promotion of safety" 9 and that "the inquiry under the Commerce Clause is ended without a weighing of the asserted safety purpose against the degree of interference with interstate commerce." 9 6 In City of Philadelphia, the Court rejected New Jersey's contention, based on earlier cases, 9 7 that innately harmful articles such as wastes were "not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce" 98 Third, the Court has focused considerable attention on two substantive aspects of the Pike formulation in resolving the disputes before it. The first is one that has always been a critical factor in Commerce Clause analysis: whether the state law, on its face or in effect, regulates "evenhandedly." Although there is nothing in its opinions to suggest that the Court is drawing brighter lines than in the past between "evenhanded" and discriminatory legislation, 1 0 2 the Court has made it clear that when, in its judgment, a state law fails to accord "evenhanded" treatment to interests protected by the Commerce Clause, the consequences are pratically inevitable. Thus when a state law "overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders," 0 3 "a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected."' 4 At the very least, once a determination is made that a state law discriminates against interstate commerce, the State is under a heavy burden to demonstrate that the local interest allegedly justifying the discrimination could not be effectuated by less discriminatory means. 1 05 If, on the other hand, the Court determines that a statute regulates "evenhandedly," its chances of surviving constitutional scrutiny are greatly enhanced. 08 The other substantive aspect of the Pike formulation which has played a key role in recent Commerce Clause cases is the Court's searching evaluation of the alternatives available to the State to achieve its purported objectives when the means the State has actu- see more in the Court's opinions than is actually there. We must not forget that the Court has written Commerce Clause opinions in recent years that do not conform precisely to the suggested pattern;"rl that, in any event, the pattern embodies little that is new from a doctrinal standpoint; 1 " 6 and, more generally, that the Court in deciding Commerce Clause cases today is not doing anything fundamentally different from what it has always done in resolving these controversies. 117 Furthermore, even assuming that the Pike formulation embraces the criteria the Court has presently adopted for adjudicating Commerce Clause cases, the formulation is sufficiently imprecise that the result of its application to particular disputes remains highly uncertain." 8 Nevertheless, while there may be less in these opinions than meets the eye, they do attest to the Court's achievement of an increased measure of doctrinal consistency in an important area of constitutional law.
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRAINTS ON STATE CONTROL OF NATURAL RESoURcES
If a new war is going to be fought over the control and exploitation of the nation's natural resources," 9 the Supreme Court will surely be an important battleground. Although such conflicts are nothing new to the nation or the Court,' 20 they have acquired special significance in an age of anxiety over shortages of energy and other natural resources. The problem, of course, is not limited to controversies in which the States themselves are the face-to-face 22 have enunciated a number of propositions that, for the moment at least, can be regarded as settled. Some of these propositions represent a simple application of the Pike formulation to natural resource regulation; others relate to specific issues arising in the natural resource context. The apparent harmony among members of the Court regarding the proper approach to many problems it has confronted in connection with natural resource regulation has not, however, led to a resolution of all of them.
A. STATE CONTROL OF PRIVATELY OVNED NATURAL RESOURCES
The implied restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause on state control of privately owned natural resources are in principle identical to the Commerce Clause restraints imposed on other aspects of state regulation. A statute regulating privately owned natural resources must do so "evenhandedly." It may not discriminate against interstate commerce by preventing the shipment of the resource outside the State, 23 by restricting access to the resource from outside the State, 124 or by providing that in-state demands for the resource be accorded preference over out-of-state demands. 2 The needs of local consumers for privately owned natural resources located within a State, even if they constitute legitimate local public interests, do not justify discriminatory legislation. Evenhanded regulation of privately owned natural resources, on the other hand, is quite likely to withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny. The States have a legitimate local interest in conserving natural resources located within their borders, 128 and it is an interest that ranks high in the Court's hierarchy of legitimate local purposes.' 29 Since the burden that evenhanded regulation imposes on interstate commerce will be tolerated unless it is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits,"' 30 such regulation of natural resources will generally be sustained even if its effect is to increase the price'3 or decrease the supply 1 3 2 of the resource.1 33 The possibility that the regulation may be economically inefficient ordinarily gives rise to no substantial constitutional objection. 3 The Constitution did not enact Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations any more than it enacted Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
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B. STATE CONTROL OF STATE-OWNED NATURAL RESOURCES
When the focus shifts from privately owned natural resources to those that are owned by the State, the Commerce Clause analysis becomes considerably more problematic. Indeed, in holding in City 127 The results of a number of earlier cases are consistent with the statement in the text, although the reasoning underlying them does not reflect modem Commerce Clause analysis. For example, Commerce Clause objections to state statutes regulating the production of natural gas were routinely dismissed on the ground that production was a local activity distinct from interstate commerce. See, e.g., Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 235 (1932). In these cases, the Court gave more serious attention to the claim that the statutes violated the resource owners' economic due process rights, but these claims too were generally rejected. See, e.g., ibid; see also It must be stressed from the outset that the references to the State's ownership interest in a natural resource as an organizational principle should not be taken to suggest that the State's ownership interest is necessarily a critical or, in some instances, even a helpful concept for purposes of analyzing the limitations that the Commerce Clause imposes on state control of natural resources. As will be seen, the nature of the State's ownership interest in a natural resource is generally only one of several factors to be considered in the Commerce Clause calculus. Still, it does seem useful, at least as a starting point of analysis, to distinguish between two types of situations involving state control of natural resources that are not privately owned. First, there are cases in which the State possesses interests in natural resources which, if they were held by a private person, would be regarded as amounting to substantial ownership, as, for example, a State's interest in trees growing on state lands. Second, there are cases in which the State's interest, even if characterized in terms associated with ownership, would ordinarily be regarded as significantly more limited, as, for example, a State's interest in water running in intrastate streams.
If a State enjoys conventional ownership rights in a natural resource, two (sometimes overlapping) considerations emerge that seem to limit the application of the Commerce Clause principles established with regard to state control of privately owned natural resources. First, there is the notion that the Commerce Clause does not require a State to spend state funds, provide state services, or otherwise distribute its resources-whether natural or man-madeto in-state residents and businesses and out-of-state residents and businesses on a nondiscriminatory basis. 137 is acting as a purchaser or seller in-as distinguished from a regulator of-the market, there is authority to suggest that it is not restrained by the negative implications of the Commerce Clause. 3 " Both of these considerations and their impact on the Commerce Clause require further elaboration. The proposition that the State may, at least in some circumstances, favor resident individuals and businesses in the distribution of state resources without violating the Constitution would seem to be a logical corollary of the basic assumptions underlying our federal system. "If," to take an example from McCready v. Virginia, 3 ' "Virginia had by law provided for the sale of its once vast public domain, and a division of the proceeds among its own people, no one, we venture to say, would contend that the citizens of other States had a constitutional right to the enjoyment of this privilege of Virginia citizenship."' 40 Nor, it may be suggested, would anyone venture to say that such action would be proscribed by the negative implications of the Commerce Clause. Whatever limitations the Constitution in general and the Commerce Clause in particular impose on the ability of the States to discriminate in favor of local interests and to prevent nonresidents from becoming residents, 14 ' it is difficult to imagine these limitations extending so far as to bar the States from making any distinctions between in-state and out-ofstate interests in distributing state resources without destroying the essential fabric of our constitutional plan. Although the principle that a State may favor its own in the distribution of state resources without running afoul of the Commerce Clause has arguably been accorded implicit sanction in the few cases that have presented the issue, 4 2 the Court has formally maintained a posture of neutrality regarding a State's "power, consistent with the Commerce Clause ... to spend state funds solely on behalf of state residents and businesses. The Court has been explicit, however, in approving the doctrine that the Commerce Clause imposes no restraints on the State when it enters the marketplace as a purchaser, and the State is therefore free under the Clause to favor in-state residents and businesses when spending state funds in that capacity. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 44 the Court upheld a Maryland statute designed to encourage the disposal of abandoned automobiles through payments of cash bounties to scrap processors. The Court found that the statute did not violate the Commerce Clause, even though the distribtuion of the bounties favored in-state interests.' 4 ' The Court recognized that it was confronted with a "situation . . . without precedent in this Court."' 146 It distinguished previous cases in which a State had sought to "interfer[e] with the natural functioning of the interstate market either through prohibition or through burdensome regulation"' 47 from the case before it in which the State had simply "entered into the market itself" "as a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce."' 48 And it concluded that "[n] othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State ... from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others. "' 49 Whatever may be the limits of these two related but analytically distinct principles," 50 could legislate to that end' 5 5 are, of course, different questions. The only question here is whether the Commerce Clause by its own force withdraws this power from the States. While the Commerce Clause may have been designed to create a national common market, it would take more than a "great silence"' 5 6 to sever the special relationship between a State and its in-state residents and businesses.' It is important to recognize, however, that the suggested conclusion, even if correct, is a narrow one. It does not tell us whether the disposition of state-owned natural resources on a preferential basis to in-state residents and businesses would pass muster under other contitutional provisions, although it seems likely that it would.Y5 8 Nor does it indicate the force of two limiting principles, whose impact is substantial. First, whatever distinctions the State may make between in-state and out-of-state interests with regard to the allocation of the State's natural resources, it is plain that it has only minimal powers to deny anyone the right to become a resident of the State or to accord him less than the full panoply of privileges it accords its long-time residents. 5 9 If a New Yorker wants to enjoy the benefits Alaska may be bestowing upon its residents as a result of its ownership of vast amounts of oil, there is little more than the price of transportation to prevent him from doing so. Second, the power the States may have to discriminate in favor of their in-state residents and businesses in the distribution of stateowned natural resources does not permit the States to attach conditions to the use or disposition of the resource that might independently burden interstate commerce or some other constitutionally protected interest. While Alaska may be able to sell its oil to residents at a preferred price, it may not, as the Court recently informed us in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 10 compel "all businesses that benefit in some way from the economic ripple effect of Alaska's decision to develop its oil and gas resources to bias their employment practices in favor of the State's residents."' 0 1
In Hicklin, the Supreme Court struck down under the Privileges and Immunities Clause an Alaska statute requiring that residents be preferred over nonresidents with regard to "all employment which is a result of oil and gas leases, easements, leases or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipeline purposes ... to which the state is a party."' 0 1 2 One of the grounds on which Alaska sought to defend the statute was that it owned all of the oil and gas with respect to which the employment preferences were required, and that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was inapplicable to "decisions by the states as to how they would permit, if at all, the use and distribution of the natural resources which they own.'1 3 The Court responded: 164 We do not agree that the fact that a State owns a resource, of itself, completely removes a law concerning that resource from the prohibitions of the Clause.... Rather than placing a statute completely beyond the Clause, a State's ownership of the property with which the statute is concerned is a factor -although oftien the crucial factor-to be considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination against noncitizens violates the Clause. The State's ownership was not enough to justify the discrimination in Hicklin because Alaska had "little or no proprietary interest in 160 437 U.S. 518 (1978). 103 Brief for Appellee, p. 20 n.14, quoted at 437 U.S. 528. 161437 U.S. at 528-29. much of the activity swept within the ambit of [the statute]""' and "the connection of the State's oil and gas with much of the covered activity [was] sufficiently attenuated so that it cannot justifiably be the basis for requiring private employers to discriminate against nonresidents."' 16 Hicklin was decided under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which in some instances provides an alternative to the Commerce Clause as a basis for constitutional adjudication.6 7 The analytical route by which a decision is reached under the two Clauses, however, is ordinarily quite different.' Even so, the Court in Hicklin specifically relied on "the mutually reinforcing relationship"'",, between the Privileges and Immunities and Commerce Clauses in an extensive dictum invoking precedents under the latter to bolster its conclusion under the former. The Court referred to its decisions establishing that the Commerce Clause forbade the States from attempting to preserve for their own residents the benefits of privately owned natural resources located within their borders.1 7 It went on to observe that in Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,' 7 ' involving Louisiana's prohibition on the out-of-state shipment of shrimp prior to local processing, the Court had limited the implications of the still vital doctrine of Geer-that Louisiana's purported ownership of the shrimp justified the State's discrimination in favor of in-state interests. The Court in Foster-Fountain had found that 165 Id. at 529.
166 Ibid.
167 Cf. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1870). Notwithstanding the occasional overlap, there are considerable differences in the scope of the two Clauses. The Privileges and Immunities Clause affords no protection to corporations, Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868), and thereby has no application to many enterprises engaged in interstate commerce. Moreover, even though a state law does not discriminate against nonresidents, so that no objection to it could plausibly be raised under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it might still be offensive to the Commerce Clause. Cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (nondiscriminatory highway-safety regulation). Although the Court in Hicklin was only incidentally concerned with the Commerce Clause, several inferences regarding its view of the restraints the Clause imposes on state control of state-owned natural resources may fairly be drawn from its remarks. The Court is apparently of the view that the Commerce Clause imposes some limits on a State's ability to prefer in-state residents and businesses in the utilization of state-owned natural resources destined for interstate commerce. Foster-Fountain, which the Court treated in the same breath as the "private ownership" cases, might have been dismissed as a case involving the "fiction" of state ownership in which the Court had enunciated a rule that was consistent with the reality of private control. But in Hicklin it was clear that Alaska owned the oil and gas as much as it is capable of owning anything. terests would very likely be invalidated. On the other hand, the Court did allow that "the fact that a state-owned resource is destined for interstate commerce does not, of itself, disable the State from preferring its own citizens in the utilization of that resource."' 175 The Court thereby reinforced the central conclusion advanced above, namely, that the Commerce Clause does not forbid the States, at least under some conditions, from favoring in-state residents and businesses in the allocation of state-owned natural resources.
Finally, and perhaps as a useful reminder of the unsettled state of the law in this area, the most recent word from the Court bearing on these issues injects a distinct element of uncertainty with regard to its views. In Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley,' 17 the South Dakota Cement Commission, created by the state legislature to carry out the manufacture, distribution, and sale of cement as "works of public necessity and importance, ' 177 The court refused to attribute any significance to the fact that Maryland was a purchaser in Alexandria Scrap, whereas South Dakota was a seller in the case before it, on the reasonable premise that the holding in Alexandria Scrap was rooted in the distinction between the State's participation in and its regulation of the market, not in the distinction between inward-and outward-moving commerce. 79 And it concluded: ISO While a state is similar to private business when it participates in the market in a purely proprietary capacity, it is also some-what different. As a government providing a public service and utilizing the money and resources of its residents, it has a right and perhaps even an obligation to consider their common good and conserve their resources so long as it does not do so by attempting to regulate or control commerce among the states. into account in the Commerce Clause balance and that the court had accorded too much weight to the fact of state ownership. If this is what the Court is saying, however, it would seem on the facts presented to signal a retreat from the implications of Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. Second, it' is possible that the Court really perceives no constitutional distinction between the "private" and "public" ownership cases. One would, however, expect the Court to be more explicit in articulating its position on this matter, especially in light of its specific discussion of the issue in earlier cases.', 2 Third, it is possible that the Court viewed the South Dakota Cement Commission as more of a regulator of than a participant in the market, although the record below does not provide much support for this position. Finally, it is possible that the Court viewed the case as presenting difficult issues that were likely to arise only in rare instances. By remanding the case, the Court might have hoped to receive further illumination about the problem or, alternatively and perhaps preferably, to have it disappear. On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its earlier holding.
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C. STATE CONTROL OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN WHICH OWNERSHIP
INTERESTS ARE NOT CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
The discussion in the preceding two subsections was addressed to cases of state control of natural resources in which ownership of the resource, whether private or public, was clearly established under conventional property-law concepts. There is, however, a third category of cases involving state control of natural resources such as wildlife, water, and air in which ownership interests, if they exist at all, are often not well established.
In Hughes v. Oklahoma the Court was dealing with wildlife, a natural resource that in its view was owned by no one. " [I] commanded the Court's attention, are now apparently to be treated substantially the same as privately owned natural resources for purposes of Commerce Clause adjudication.
Once one leaves the area of wildlife, however, the terrain becomes less certain. Two cases handed down by the Court in the heyday of nineteenth-century legal fictions suggest some of the difficulties likely to be encountered in this context under contemporary Commerce Clause analysis. In McCready v. Virginia,' 94 a Maryland resident, who had planted oysters in Virginia's inland tidewaters, was convicted of violating a statute forbidding nonresidents from planting oysters in Virginia waters. Over MacCready's objections that the prohibition violated the Privileges and Immunities and Commerce Clauses, the Court sustained the conviction. Dismissing the latter claim on the ground that production is not commerce, 195 the Court devoted its principal attention to the former. It began with the "settled" doctrine that "each State owns the beds of all tide-waters within its jurisdiction . . .
[and] the tidewaters themselves."' 96 "For this purpose," the Court continued, "the State represents its people, and the ownership is that of the people in their united sovereignty."' 19 7 The Court therefore reasoned that the State: 1 9 has the right to appropriate its tide-waters and their beds to be used by its people as a common for taking and cultivating fish.... Such an appropriation is in effect nothing more than a regulation of the use by the people of their common property.
193 This is not to suggest, however, that every state law that would pass constitutional muster as an evenhanded regulation of wildlife would likewise survive constitutional scrutiny as a regulation of privately owned resources. A law forbidding any hunting of certain animals might well be sustained as an evenhanded conservation measure; a law forbidding any production of oil from privately owned wells would raise more difficult constitutional issues. This may simply be another way of saying that the Court's decision in Hughes has not divested the States of their traditional role as managers of wildlife located within their borders, so long as such management is undertaken on a nondiscriminatory basis. In light of these principles, and the premise that the Privileges and Immunities Clause "extended only to such privileges and immunities as are 'in their nature fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments,' "I" the Court had no hesitation in concluding that Virginia had not denied a Maryland resident a "privilege" or "immunity" of citizenship by confining the use of Virginia's oyster beds to its own residents. "We think we may safely hold that the citizens of one State are not invested by this clause of the Constitution with any interest in the common property of the citizens of another State. 20 0 From a doctrinal standpoint, McCready has unquestionably been eroded. Production may not be commerce, but its regulation by the State will be limited by the negative implications of the Commerce Clause if such production substantially affects commerce among the States. 0 1 It may be that only "fundamental" rights are protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 20 2 but the Court today might strike down the Virginia statute under that Clause as an impermissibly pervasive discrimination against nonresidents to achieve whatever goals it may permissibly pursue as a consequence of its ownership of the resource. 20 3 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly asserted that " It] he whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource." 20 4 Perhaps so. But McCready may not be ready for last rites. The Commerce Clause 208 would today impose some limits on the restrictions Virginia might place on the use of its tidelands. The central question, however, is whether those limits are the same as the restraints imposed on its control of wildlife or whether they are more akin to the limits imposed on its control of state-owned natural resources, which contemplate the possibility of some in-state preferences, without regard to the availability of nondiscriminatory alternatives. The discrediting of the "common ownership" doctrine does not necessarily resolve the issue. That doctrine has been maligned largely in cases involving the State's claim to ownership of wildlife which, as a practical matter, nobody owned. 2 09 But tidelands are arguably analytically distinct from fish and birds. The States have an interest in their tidelands which, while distinguishable from A's fee interest in Blackacre, may nevertheless be characterized as a substantial one. 210 Hence, even if the "common ownership" theory on which the State's claims were originally predicated has no place in contemporary Commerce Clause analysis-whether wildlife or tidelands are at issue-it does not necessarily follow that the consequences in each instance are the same. Exposure of the fiction of "common ownership" of game may lead to the conclusion that in reality it is owned by no one and that the Commerce Clause criteria governing privately owned natural resources should therefore apply. 21 ' But exposing the fiction of "common ownership" of tidelands may reveal that in reality the State's ownership interest is significant, and that the appropriate analogy for Commerce Clause purposes would be to state mineral holdings or state forests rather than wildlife. There is considerable learning and controversy concerning the States' interest in the tidelands, 212 and no claim to expertise is being made here. The point is only that tidelands may be different from wildlife with regard to the reality of state ownership and its recognition for Commerce Clause purposes.
213
A second factor that might bear on the determination whether Virginia's oyster beds should be treated differently from unowned resources under the Commerce Clause is the extent to which the State itself had acted as a proprietor of the resource. If the States had expended large sums of money to develop, manage, and cultivate oyster beds located in state waters, one might regard the entire enterprise as a "statewide oyster 'farm' ", 214 subsidized by the State, to which access might reasonably be limited to in-state residents and businesses under the principle discussed in the preceding subsection.
While these factors could breathe some new life into McCready, there are countervailing considerations that should not be ignored. The general drift of Supreme Court doctrine in this area has been toward greater freedom in the interstate market, 21 5 and, when the case is close, "free trade" interests are likely to prevail over the States' interests in providing for their own, which are easily portrayed as forces of "economic Balkanization. 21 8 Moreover, in dealing with the tidelands, the Court may feel it is dealing with a resource that is impressed with a national interest, 2 1 7 and it thus might be particularly vigilant in protecting the resource from local economic prejudice. Finally, even if some concession to the States' ownership interest in their tidelands is made, it must be kept in mind that the States are confined in their ability to translate this ownership interest in a resource into restrictions that would independently burden the Commerce Clause. 218 Indeed, in Johnson v. Haydel, 219 a companion case to Foster-Fountain, the Court invalidated Louisiana's attempt to impose, with respect to oysters it claimed to own, restrictions similar to those it had sought to impose on the interstate shipment of shrimp. Whatever limits Virginia may 'still be able to impose on access to its oyster beds under a refurbished version of McCready, it surely may not impose any limitations on the disposition of oysters taken from those beds, beyond those limitations that are permissible as applied to a privately owned resource.
Like their interest in oyster beds located within their jurisdictions, the States' interest in water situated within their borders may be strong enough to raise questions regarding their power over the resource that cannot be disposed of merely by reference to cases involving wildlife. In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 0 the Court upheld a New Jersey statute making it unlawful for anyone to export "the waters of any fresh water lake, pond, brook, creek, river or stream of this State into any other State, for use therein." '221 Over objections predicated on the Contract, Commerce, Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses, the Court sustained an injunction against a water company under contract with the City of New York to prevent the company from carrying waters of a New Jersey river outside the State. Without deciding whether the State could prohibit the acquisition of large quantities of water from state streams in its capacity as "owner" of the bed of the stream and of all rights in the water not belonging to riparian proprietors, 2 22 the Court preferred to rest its decision "upon a broader ground... [that] is independent of the more or less attenuated residuum of title that the State may be said to possess. ' 2 22 In substance, the Court held that the State's "police power.. . . to protect the atmosphere, the water and the forests within its territory, ' the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit. '' 22 The Court relied in part on Geer's "preservation" rationale, 226 as well as on Geer's holding that a State might qualify the property interest one receives in a resource to prevent it from becoming an object of interstate commerce..
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Like McCready, Hudson County has suffered serious erosion from a doctrinal point of view. The general proposition that a State may "preserve" natural resources located within its borders by forbidding their exportation or by qualifying the property interest that private parties acquire in such resources was finally laid to rest with the overruling of Geer. While the State's alleged "ownership" of the water might have provided an independent ground for such a holding, the Supreme Court, as noted, explicitly refused to rest its decision on that ground. 228 By its own terms, then, Hudson County represents a precedent of doubtful validity.
But what about its outcome? If the New Jersey statute were defended today on the ground that New Jersey's ownership interest in the water was sufficient to remove it from the rules of the privately owned resource cases, which it clearly could not survive, would the statute nevertheless withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny? I should think not. Even if a State enjoyed conventional ownership rights in a natural resource, thus implicating the rules applicable to state control of state-owned resources, it seems highly unlikely for reasons suggested above 229 that an absolute bar on the exportation of the resource is the type of preference for in-state interests that might be tolerated on the basis of state ownership. But Hudson County is an easy case. 2 arguably consenting to laws like Oklahoma's. 4 The confidence with which the Court disposed of the controversy in Hughes, moreover, cannot obscure the significance of the underlying conflict between the nation's interest in unfettered commerce among the States and the States' interest in controlling the disposition of their natural resources, a conflict that extends far beyond the question of whether Oklahoma may keep natural minnows within its borders. Lurking behind the "fictions" of State ownership, which the Court found so easy to abandon in Hughes, are realities of state ownership that present much harder cases. 
